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I. STANDARD ON REVIEW 
In its brief, the Idaho State Bar provides its rendition of the appropriate Standard of 
Review to be followed by this Court. As I understand it, the Idaho State Bar's primary 
difference in characterization of the Standard of Review from mine is that the Idaho State Bar 
suggests that trial court or civil court principles should apply to this case. This is incorrect. 
This Court, in Matter of Jenkins, 120 Idaho 379, 384, 816 P.2d 335 (1991), rejected such 
an analysis. It said, "in an attorney disciplinary action we are guided by different legal 
principles which require our independent review of the record and assessment of the evidence." 
The Court went on to say, "[i]n addition, in conducting our review and assessment of the record 
we must apply the clear and convincing burden of proof standard historically required in attorney 
disbarment and disciplinary actions. In re Campbell, 95 Idaho 87, 502 P.2d 1100 (1972); In re 
Felton, 60 Idaho 540, 94 P.2d 166 (1939); In re Baum, 32 Idaho 676,186 P. 927 (1920)." 
[Emphasis added.] Civil or trial court principles are largely inapplicable in disciplinary cases 
like this one. 
In Matter of Jenkins, the Court also said, "While great weight should be accorded the 
findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and Board, we cannot abdicate our 
responsibility to independently review the record and make our own assessment and judgment of 
the evidence as traditionally and consistently required of us by case law spanning decades. In re 
Lutz, 100 Idaho 45, 592 P.2d 1362 (1979); In re Bowen, 95 Idaho 334, 508 P.2d 1240 (1973); In 
re Baum, 32 Idaho 676, 186 P. 927 (1920). Disciplinary matters are judicial and not 
administrative nor truly appellate in nature. The responsibility for assessing the facts and 
ordering the sanctions to be imposed on an attorney ultimately rests with this Court." Matter of 
Jenkins at 379. "Clear and convincing evidence is generally understood to be evidence 
indicating that the thing to proved is highly probable or reasonably certain." State v. Kimball, 
145 Idaho 542, 546, 181 P.3d 468 (2008). Accordingly, while this Court should give great 
weight to the Hearing Committee's recommendation, this Court is still obligated to assess the 
evidence itself and verify that only "clear and convincing" evidence is used. 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
a. In the Robert Hall matter, the Hearing Committee acted arbitrarily and capriciously when 
it ignored relevant, competent and material evidence and failed to correctly apply the ABA 
Standards describing sanctions. 
b. In the Robert Illingworth, the Hearing Committee acted arbitrarily and capriciously when 
it ignored relevant, competent and material evidence and failed to correctly apply the ABA 
Standards describing sanctions. 
c. My Suspension Should Start January 31, 2008. 
d. The Idaho State Bar should be bound by its specific and repeated statements that a 
suspension is the correct sanction in this case and that the suspension should begin on January 
31,2008. 
e. The Hearing Committee ignored, or at least failed to fully acknowledge, my mitigation 
evidence offered during the April 4, 2011 hearing. 
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f. This Court should follow the principles enumerated in prior discipline cases decided by 
this Court. 
g. The manner in which the Supreme Court's rejected the stipulation between the Idaho 
State Bar and me resolving this case violated my Due Process Rights. 
h. The Hearing Committee's decisions were too late. 
III. ARGUMENT 
a. In the Robert Hall matter, the Hearing Committee acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously when it ignored relevant, competent and material evidence and failed to 
correctly apply the ABA Standards describing sanctions. 
As I stated in my Opening Brief, the central and most important aspect of the Robert Hall 
matter is the Conflict ofInterest allegation. The other charges, 1.3 [lack of diligence] and S.4(d) 
[engaging in actions prejudicial to the administration of justice], are factually based entirely on 
the Conflict of Interest allegation. I admitted all three. The Conflict of Interest claim is really a 
condition precedent for the other two charges. Functionally, the other two charges are wholly 
included in the Conflict of Interest charge. In essence, without the Conflict of Interest charge, no 
facts remain on which to base the other two. Accordingly, my analysis of an appropriate 
sanction for my violation of all three charges began and ended with the Conflict of Interest 
charge, as it should have. However, for the reasons stated below, when the 1.3 and S.4(d) 
charges are evaluated on their own, the Hearing Committee's recommendation is still wrong. 
II II / 
II/II 
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Lack of diligence is covered by ABA Standard for Imposing Lawyer Sanction 4.4. 
4.4 LACK OF DILIGENCE 
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon factors, ... , the following 
sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving a failure to act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client: 
4.43 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent and does not 
act with reasonable diligence in representing a client, and causes injury or potential injury 
to a client. 
The Hearing Committee had only my admissions in the Pre-Hearing Stipulation and the 
letter from Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney as evidence with which to determine its sanction 
recommendation for my violation of the diligence standard. Nothing, however, in that evidence 
suggests that, as it relates to my diligence in representing Robert Hall, I did anything that would 
justify more than a reprimand. There is no clear and convincing evidence in the record which 
proves that I was any more than negligent nor that my actions caused any more than potential 
injury to Mr. Hall. 
The next more severe sanction is a suspension. It is covered by Section 4.42. Section 
4.42 states: 
4.42 Suspension is generally appropriate when: 
(a) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes 
injury or potential injury to a client; or, 
(b) a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect and causes injury or potential 
injury to a client. 
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There is not clear and convincing evidence in the record of this case that proves that I 
neglected Mr. Hall's case in any way. This standard is inapplicable. 
Engaging in actions prejudicial to the administration of justice is arguably covered by 
ABA Standard for Imposing Lawyer Sanction 6.1. 
6.1 LACK OF DILIGENCE 
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon factors, ... , the following 
sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice or that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation to 
a court: 
6.11 Disbarment if generally appropriate when a lawyer, with the intent to 
deceive the court, makes a false statement, submits a false document, or improperly 
withholds material information, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, 
or causes a significant or potentially significant adverse effect on the legal proceeding. 
6.12 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows that false 
statements or documents are being submitted to the court or that material information is 
improperly being withheld, and takes no remedial action, and causes injury or potential 
injury to a party to the legal proceeding, or causes an adverse or potentially adverse effect 
on the legal proceeding. 
The Commentary section of 6.12 states that "[ s ]uspension is appropriate when a lawyer 
has not acted with intent to deceive the court, but when he knows that material information is 
being withheld and does not inform the court, .... " There is not clear and convincing evidence 
in the record of this case which proves that I knew that material information was withheld from 
the court. As I admitted, I was negligent in representing Mr. Hall when a conflict of interest 
existed. Section 6.13 provides that negligence should subject a lawyer to a reprimand. 
At the most, I should be given a sanction of a reprimand for my violation of the ethical 
provision prohibiting the engaging in actions prejudicial to the administration of justice. Nothing 
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in the record of this case justifies a more serious sanction. There is no evidence that I submitted 
false documents to the court, either with or without the intent to deceive the court. I couldn't 
have. I was APPOINTED to represent Mr. Hall during his post-conviction case by Judge Robert 
Elgee. [Tr., P. 58, L. 1] (Located at R., P. 130) Judge Elgee would not have appointed me 
until AFTER he received Mr. Hall's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and supporting 
documents. Nothing in the record of this case indicates that I was any more than negligent. 
Further, the Hearing Committee was wholly incorrect in at least two ways relating to 
Robert Hall. First, on pages 16 and 17 of its decision, the Hearing Committee, apparently 
because of its confusion or failure to understand the post-conviction process here in Idaho, found 
me to be "not credible" on the Robert Hall issue. The Hearing Committee said: 
"7. The Defendant [I'm the Respondent] asserts that he advised Hall that there was a 
conflict of interest in representing him on his appeal as there was a potential issue regarding the 
Defendant's own effectiveness as trial counsel. Although the Defendant also asserted that Hall 
orally waived the conflict of interest, the Hearing Committee finds that this was not the case 
because Hall raised ineffectiveness of trial counsel in his Affidavit in support of his pro se 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and the Defendant was not credible on this issue." This 
statement is illogical. Robert Hall filed his Affidavit BEFORE I was appointed to represent him. 
As I stated above and in my Opening Brief, I admit I was negligent in agreeing to 
represent Mr. Hall when a conflict of interest existed. However, there is no evidence in this 
record, and there certainly could have been if it existed, that Mr. Hall did not waive the conflict 
6 
of interest as I testified that he orally did to me when I visited him at the Idaho correctional 
facility south of Boise. 
Also, the Hearing Committee created and utilized its own test for determining whether 
my actions caused serious or potentially serious injury to a party, or caused a significant or 
potentially significant adverse effect on the legal proceeding. The Hearing Committee applied a 
really somewhat bizarre standard by suggesting that because Mr. Hall ultimately was given Rule 
35 sentence relief by Judge Elgee, that I adversely affected the legal proceeding. First, the 
beneficiary of the hearing-indeed, the person who brought the post-conviction proceeding-
was Mr. Hall. Any adverse effect had to be judged with regard to him and not the public. Also, 
can't any successful work on an appeal or a criminal trial or any time ajudge gives a person a 
sentence shorter that he or she could have given amount to exactly what the hearing Committee 
states I did wrong? The Committee simply misapplied the ABA Standard here. 
At least one point would considering is that there is no clear and convincing evidence at 
all that I was ineffective. At page 26, paragraph 12 of the Hearing Committee Decision, this 
point is important because the Committee states that I acted selfishly in representing Hall 
because I "acted knowingly and intentionally, with the conscious objective or purpose to 
accomplish a particular result, i.e., the receipt and retention of professional fees, and the 
concealment of his potential ineffective assistance as trial counsel." Such a conclusion is absurd 
and unlawful, there is no evidence-certainly not clear and convincing evidence-that I was ever 
paid for my work for Robert Hall. Equally, there is no evidence that I was ineffective. In fact, 
there is no evidence that I did anything other than try to help a man whose case had been botched 
7 
by court-appointed appellate counsel after I had worked tirelessly to create a very good appellate 
record for them to work with. [R., 109] 
b. In the Robert Illingworth, the Hearing Committee acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously when it ignored relevant, competent and material evidence and failed to 
correctly apply the ABA Standards describing sanctions. 
My argument regarding this Count is fully and completely made in my Opening Brief. I 
will not restate that information here. However, the Idaho State Bar does raise few points which 
I should briefly explain and correct. 
The Idaho State Bar describes as "incredulous" my describing the Illingworth matter as 
fee dispute. This is unfair and ignores evidence in the record introduced by the Idaho State Bar. 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 2 relates to Robert Illingworth's mother's claim with the Client Assistance 
Fund. (Mr. Illingworth's mother's name is Mrs. Vermette.) In her claim, she demanded a return 
of the entire $12,000 fee paid to me. The Fund committee awarded substantially less, after I 
denied Mrs. Vermette's claims and requested a hearing. Mrs. Vermette's claim was notarized, 
apparently by a relative, on July 26,2006. (Mr. Illingworth's letter firing me was dated two days 
later. I would not have received it until after that date.) Also, in Idaho State Bar's Exhibit 2, are 
numerous documents showing that Mr. Illingworth defamed me to at least one other client, a 
fellow inmate of Mr. Illingworth as the Orofino prison. [Plaintiff s Exhibit 2] 
I have repeatedly admitted that I could have handled the Illingworth matter better. 
However, I did fee that I was under attack and I still believe that my feelings did have merit. 
/ II II 
/ II II 
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c. My Suspension Should Start January 31, 2008. 
The period of suspension should start on January 31, 2008 and run concurrently with the 
suspension I am currently serving. The plaintiff Idaho State Bar, through its attorney, Brad 
Andrews, has repeatedly explained how and why a suspension should be imposed-both to the 
Hearing Committee and to this Court. I would be hard pressed to name a person with more 
expertise than Mr. Andrews in how disciplinary sanctions should be imposed; Mr. Andrews's 
experience as to how sanctions have been imposed in just as extensive. 
The reasons for beginning any sanction, whether suspension or disbarment, on January 
31,2008 are logically and clearly described in the October 6,2010 Stipulation, drafted by Bar 
Counsel, Mr. Andrews, and executed by Bar Counsel and me. (This Stipulation was approved 
and recommended by the Hearing Committee, but rejected by this Court.) [R., 28-92, 93-95] 
The Idaho State Bar said nothing in its arguments in its Respondent's Brief which should lead 
anyone to believe that what the Idaho State Bar said in the Stipulation is now untrue. 
The October 6, 2010 Stipulation is in the record of this case at two places. One place is 
at pages 28 through 92 of the Record. The other place is at pages 88 through 100 of the Idaho 
State Bar's Exhibit 9. 
Paragraph 11 of the October 6, 2010 Stipulation states: 
Bar Counsel and Respondent also discussed the unique procedural circumstances 
relating to Respondent's suspension in 2008 following the conclusion of the reciprocal 
disciplinary proceeding relating to his representation of clients in Oregon. Specifically, 
the parties discussed that the professional misconduct alleged in Counts One and Two 
[Illingworth and Hall] occurred prior to Respondent's suspension in 2008, but because 
they were not reciprocal charges, they could not be included in that reciprocal 
charge proceeding . .... Although the consequences of the professional misconduct 
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were not conclusively determined until after Respondent began his suspension, the 
professional misconduct underlying those two counts occurred prior to that 
suspension. Given the rather unique procedural posture of these two cases, Bar Counsel 
considered that, since it is common to include multiple allegations against a respondent 
attorney relating to different representation during the general period of time that the 
misconduct occurred, all of this conduct would normally have been considered 
together in a non-reciprocal disciplinary case. In such circumstances, the maximum 
suspension, disbarment or time for resignation in lieu of discipline, would be five 
years. Since one of Respondent's cases was a reciprocal disciplinary case, thereby not 
allowing for the inclusion of other unrelated professional misconduct charges, the 
potential for a suspension for more than five years in these two cases did not seem 
consistent with I.B.C.R. 506. Thus, the agreed upon resolution of this case takes into 
account the prior disciplinary order and seeks to fashion a resolution of Respondent's 
professional misconduct consistent with how other disciplinary respondents have 
been treated ..... (Emphasis added.) [R.,33-34] 
Probably the most important point made above is that to fail to start any period of 
suspension or disbarment in January of2008 would result in my being treated in a manner NOT 
"consistent with how other disciplinary respondents have been treated". Such treatment of me 
would not comply with the Equal protection provisions of the United States Constitution. 
"Every person is entitled to equal protection of the law, and equal protection of the law means 
that equal protection and security shall be given to all under like circumstance in his life, his 
liberty and his property and in the pursuit of happiness, and in the exemption from any greater 
burdens and charges than are equally imposed upon all others under like circumstances." Ex 
Parte Knapp, 73 Idaho 505, 508,254 P.2d 411 (1953). 
Whether I am disbarred or further suspended, the beginning point should be January 31, 
2008. To do otherwise would cause me to be treated worse than other sanctioned lawyers under 
similar circumstances-the Idaho State Bar and its attorney have said as much, repeatedly-and 
this would violate constitutional guarantees of Equal protection. 
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Also, my bad acts were done by me years before the Idaho State Bar filed its Complaint 
in this case in 2010. The same is true of other events relating to when this case could have been 
filed. I was appointed to represent Robert Hall before November 12,2004, the date I filed 
Robert Hall's Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. [R.,49] On March 7, 2007, the 
Court of Appeals filed its opinion concluded that the appointment of me created a conflict that 
directly resulted in the waiver of Robert's ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. [R., 50] 
On September 12,2007, the Client Assistance Fund Committee filed its recommendation to pay 
Loretta Vermette. [R., 47] 
Also relevant to any suspension or disbarment starting date is the fact that this Court filed 
its order suspending me on January 17, 2008-AFTER the events that are the basis of this case. 
In this Court's Disciplinary Order entered on January 17,2008, this Court stated: "Probation 
should be imposed pursuant to Idaho Bar Commission 506( c). Probation under Rule 506( c) is 
appropriate since there is little likelihood that Defendant will harm the public during the period 
of probation and the conditions of probation can be adequately supervised by Bar Counsel's 
office." [R.,43] 
d. The Idaho State Bar should be bound by its specific and repeated statements 
that a suspension is the correct sanction in this case and that the suspension should begin 
on January 31, 2008. 
Before the Hearing Committee entered, first, its order recommending that I be disbarred, 
and later, its order that my disbarment should be effective as of January 31, 2010, the Idaho State 
Bar consistently and repeatedly stated that I should be further suspended, rather than be 
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disbarred, and that any suspension should run from January 31,2008. In addition to drafting and 
executing the Stipulation described in Section c., above, during the April 4, 2011 Hearing in this 
case, the Idaho State Bar, through its attorney, stated no fewer than five times that I should be 
suspended, rather than disbarred, and that my suspension should start January 31, 2008 in order 
to be no more than a total of five years. [Ir., P. 138, L. 4-7; Ir., P. 138, L. 16-20; Ir., P. 139, L. 
17-19; Ir., P. 161, L.15-18; Ir. P. 165, L. 10-12; Ir., P. 166, L. 3-5; Ir., P. 166,10-12] (Found 
at R., pp. 150, 156 and 157) Repeatedly, Bar Counsel stated that any suspension I serve should 
allow me to return to the practice oflaw on February of2013. Also, when it explained how a 
disbarment would be calculated-if the Committee chose to recommend as much-the Idaho 
State Bar stated that any disbarment period would likewise run from January 31, 2008. 
Ihese statements were judicial admissions. "'A judicial admission is a statement made 
by a party or attorney, in the course of judicial proceedings, for the purpose, or with the effect, of 
dispensing with the need for proof by the opposing party of some fact.' Sun Valley Potato 
Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 765, 86 P.3d 475.479 (2004). 'Ajudicial 
admission is a deliberate, clear, unequivocal statement of a party about a concrete fact within the 
party's particular knowledge, not a matter oflaw ... [not] opinion.' 29A Am.Jur.2d, Evidence 
Section 770 (1994)." In re Universe Life Ins. Co., 144 Idaho 751, 759, 171 P.3d 242 (2007). 
"Generally, judicial admissions remove the admitted facts from the field of controversy. 
Perryv. Schaumann, 110 Idaho 596, 598, 716 P.2d 1368,1370 (Ct.App.1986); McLean [v. City 
a/Spirit Lake), 91 Idaho [778] at 783, 430 P.2d at 674 [(1967)], 29A AMJUR.2d Evidence 
section 770. Ihe party making a judicial admission is bound by the statement and may not 
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controvert the statement on trial or appeal. 29 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & MICHAEL H. 
GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE section 6726 (Interim Edition 1992); 
see also McLean, 91 Idaho at 783, 430 P.2d at 674; Cloughley v. Orange Transportation Co., 80 
Idaho 226, 230,327 P.2d 369,371 (1958." Strouse v. K-Tek, Inc., 129 Idaho 616, 618, 930 P.2d 
1361 (1997). 
Until I raised the issue after the Hearing Committee issued its decision, the Idaho State 
Bar had never even suggested that I should be subjected to a suspension or disbarment period 
that started after January 31, 2008. It was not an issue. The Idaho State Bar did not raise the 
issue in its Complaint. [R., 2-12] But, it did address the issue in the October 6, 2010 Stipulation 
and during the April 4, 2011 hearing. [R., 33-34; Tr., P. 138, L. 4-7; Tr., P. 138, L. 16-20; Ir., P. 
139, L. 17-19; Tr., P. 161, L.15-18; Ir. P. 165, L. 10-12; Ir., P. 166, L. 3-5; Ir., P. 166, 10-12] 
(The transcript entries are found at R., pp. 150, 156 and 157) And, repeatedly and continuously 
the Idaho State Bar stated that any sanction in this case should start on January 31, 2008. 
Ihese statements were judicial admissions. Ihe Idaho State Bar should be not now be 
able to argue a position contrary to them. Any sanction imposed upon me should start on 
January 31, 2008. 
e. The Hearing Committee ignored, or at least failed to fully acknowledge my 
mitigation evidence offered during the April 4,2011 hearing. 
In my Opening Brief, I included in the Statement of Facts section pages of mitigation 
evidence which the Hearing Committee apparently failed to consider. It certainly did not discuss 
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it in the one-half page (of its thirty-page-Iong decision) in which it said anything about my 
mitigation evidence. 
The Hearing Committee provided no further analysis of my mitigation evidence in its 
decision on my Motion to Alter or Amend. Also, despite the Idaho State Bar's contention to the 
contrary, the Committee's merely saying that it did something, is not evidence that it actually did 
it. 
f. Prior cases. 
I have adequately and completely covered this issue in my Opening Brief. However, I 
shouldn't need to remind the Court--but I will--that the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution requires that my sanctions be consistent with those imposed upon other attorneys 
under similar circumstances. 
g. The way the Supreme Court's rejected the stipulation between the Idaho 
State Bar and me resolving this case violated my Due Process Rights. 
On October 6, 2010, the Idaho State Bar and I executed and filed with this Court a 
stipulation resolving this case.[R., 28-92] On November 30, 2010, this Court rejected the 
stipulation with an order to the Hearing Committee directing it to "reconsider the imposition of 
more significant sanctions." [R., 184] Purportedly, the sanctions described in the stipulation 
were not adequate. However, when this Court executed this order, it did so without a hearing, 
without a complete record and without the benefit of briefing. 
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"A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from any other occupation 
in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment." Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232, 
_ S.Ct. _ (1957). [Emphasis added.] "The essence of due process is the right to be heard at 
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 
S. Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); .... " State, Bureau of Child Support Services v. Garcia, 132 
Idaho 505, 510, 975 P.2d 793, 798 (Idaho App, 1999). "[T]he decisionmaker's conclusion as to 
a [person's] eligibility must rest solely on the legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing. 
Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. PUC, 301 U.S. 292 (1937); United States v. Abilene & s. R. Co., 265 U.S. 
264,288-289 (1924). To demonstrate compliance with this elementary requirement, the decision 
maker should state the reasons for his determination and indicate the evidence he relied on, cf 
Wichita R. & Light Co. v. PUC, 260 U.S. 48,57-59 (1922), .... " Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 
254,271, _ S.Ct. _ (1970). 
Effectively, when the Court executed its "more significant sanctions" order, it told the 
Hearing Panel, the Idaho State Bar and Bar Counsel, Brad Andrews, to get tougher. It can not be 
denied that when this Court said "reconsider the imposition of more significant sanctions," it did 
so without giving me a hearing. How can this procedure be in compliance with Due Process 
requirements for a hearing? 
The Due Process violation does come from the fact that this Court rejected the 
stipulation. It could do that. The Due Process violation arises from the manner in which the 
Court rejected it. And, the Idaho State Bar's argument that my Due Process rights were not 
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violated because this Court is charged with the ultimate responsibility of assessing facts and 
ordering discipline is unsound. If the Hearing Committee followed the "reconsider the 
imposition of more significant sanctions" order, which it obviously did, decisions were made in 
this case by both this Court and by the Hearing Committee before I was given a hearing. Again, 
how can such a procedure comply with Constitutional Due Process requirements? 
The Idaho State Bar's argument that an "eventual" hearing is good enough is also 
unsound. A flawed hearing, that is, a hearing that follows this Court's order as to what to do, 
still fails to comply with Due Process. 
The Constitution's Due Process provisions require that I have a "right to be heard at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner" (State, Bureau of Child Support Services v. 
Garcia, 132 Idaho at 510) and that the Hearing Committee's decision be based solely on the 
legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing (Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 at 271). When 
this Court, without hearing evidence, gives any "starting point" directions to the Hearing 
Committee and then gives "great weight" to that Hearing Committee's subsequent 
recommendation, I have not been given the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner and to have the Hearing Committee's decision be based solely on evidence 
adduced at my hearing. 
The manner in which this Court rejected the settlement stipulation in this case and its 
giving pre-hearing instructions to the Hearing Committee violated my Due Process rights as 
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. 
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h. The Hearing Committee's decisions were too late. 
Idaho Bar Commission Rule 511 (h) says: 
Hearing Committee Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations. In every Formal 
Charge case assigned to it, the Hearing Committee shall issue its findings of fact, conclusions of 
law and recommendations. 
(1) Service on Parties. The Hearing Committee shall send to the Clerk, who shall 
serve upon all parties, the findings of fact, conclusions oflaw and recommendations within 28 
days following the conclusion of the hearing. (Emphasis added.) 
Idaho Bar Commission Rule 511 (h) also states: 
(2) Motion to alter or Amend. A motion to alter or amend the findings and 
recommendations of a Hearing Committee may be filed by either party, not later than 14 days 
after those findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendations have been served upon the 
parties. 
I.B.C.R. 511 (h) also states: 
The Hearing Committee shall consider the motion and shall, within 14 days of receipt 
of the motion: 
(A) alter or amend its findings its findings of facts, conclusions of law, and 
recommendations; 
(B) deny the motion; or 
(C) schedule the motion for hearing. (Emphasis added.) 
The Hearing Committee's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law following the April 
4,2011 hearing, held after this Court's "reconsideration" order, was filed with the Clerk of the 
Professional Responsibility on July 27, 2011, eighty-six days late. [R.,183-213] I timely filed 
my Motion to Alter or Amend on August 11,2011. [R.,214] The Hearing Committee's action 
(altering or amending or denying or scheduling for hearing) was due no later than August 25, 
2011. It was filed with the Clerk of the Professional Responsibility on November 9, 2011, 
seventy-six days late. [264-268] 
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A State may not exclude a person from the practice of law in a manner that violates the 
Due Process guarantees of the United States Constitution. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners 
of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232,238, _ S.Ct. (1957). As stated in Section h. above, "The 
essence of due process is the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. 
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,333,96 S.Ct. 893,47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); .... " State, 
Bureau of Child Support Services v. Garcia, l32 Idaho 505, 510, 975 P.2d 793, 798 (Idaho App, 
1999). Also, "[t]he decisionmaker's conclusion as to a [person's] eligibility must rest solely on 
the legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. PUC, 301 U.S. 292 
(1937); United States v. Abilene & s. R. Co., 265 U.S. 264, 288-289 (1924). To demonstrate 
compliance with this elementary requirement, the decision maker should state the reasons for his 
determination and indicate the evidence he relied on, cf Wichita R. & Light Co. v. PUc, 260 
U.S. 48,57-59 (1922), .... " Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,271, _ S.Ct. _ (1970). 
Unlike Idaho state statutes which are apparently written by legislators from all walks of 
life, logically, the Idaho Bar Commission Rules were written by members of the Idaho State Bar, 
i.e., lawyers. Equally logically, when those lawyers chose to use the term "shall" when they 
wrote LB.C.R. 511, they did so for a reason. A reasonable argument is that they used "shall" 
because they meant shall. 
The Idaho State Bar first points out that the Idaho Bar Commission Rules state that "the 
time in which any act or anything is to be done or performed is not jurisdictional." LB.C.R. 
525(i). Apparently, the Bar's argument is that unlike most instances when things have to be 
done on time for a court or agency to acquire jurisdiction, the hearing Committee does not lose 
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jurisdiction by being late, even very late. The Idaho State Bar's argument misses the point. 
Merely complying with rules, even those relating to jurisdiction, does not mean that a Hearing 
Committee's actions complied with Due Process requirements. The procedures outlined in the 
rules must comply with Due Process. Schware, 353 U.S. 232. "Jurisdictional" is not necessarily 
"constitutional" . 
When Committees (and courts) produce very late decisions, they risk forgetting evidence 
and certainly give the impression of a decision that is incorrect and does not comply with the 
rules. (As stated in Section e. above, the Hearing Committee did fail to discuss, and apparently 
fail to consider, significant amounts of mitigation evidence and because of the Committee's 
failure to discuss, in any meaningful detail, my mitigation evidence, there is no evidence that 
they considered it or even remembered it.) 
Also, without citing any legal justification, the Idaho State Bar claims that I must produce 
evidence that I was prejudiced by the Committee's delay. First, I have shown prejudice when I 
pointed out that the Committee failed to discuss my mitigation evidence. Next, I certainly could 
not have entered evidence into the record during the April 4, 2011 hearing to justify the prejUdice 
I would suffer in the future as the result of the Committee's repeated late actions. 
When the Hearing Committee failed to prepare and file timely decisions in this case, it 
failed to comply with the Due Process requirements that procedures result in meaningful 
hearings (and apparently meaningful decisions) in a meaningful manner. And, it certainly 
doesn't help make things better when those late decisions fail to specifically mention mitigation 
evidence provided to the Committee during the hearing. 
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The Hearing Committee's decisions were so late as to violate Due Process. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Hearing Committee acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it ignored relevant, 
competent and material evidence and failed to correctly apply the ABA Standards describing 
sanctions. The correct ABA Standards for Imposing Attorney Discipline call for no more than a 
reprimand in the Hall matter and a suspension in the Illingworth matter. 
Any suspension should begin January 31, 2008 and the Idaho State Bar should not now 
be allowed to argue against this. It has clearly and repeatedly explained to the Hearing 
Committee and to this Court that this is the appropriate sanction. Its previous statements are 
judicial admissions and it is bound not to argue against them now. 
The Hearing Committee failed to properly consider my mitigation evidence when it 
formulated its recommendation regarding the sanction I should serve. This, too, was arbitrary 
and capricious. 
This Court should not accord any weight to the Hearing Committee's sanction 
recommendation. The hearing Committee's were so late as to violate the U.S. Constitution's 
guarantees of Due Process. 
Finally, this Court, too, violated my Due Process rights when, without a hearing, the 
benefit of briefing or a complete record, it rejected the stipulation of the Idaho State Bar and me 
/1/1/ 
/1/1/ 
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resolving this case and directed the Hearing Committee and Bar Counsel to proceed to enter 
"more significant sanctions" upon me. 
DATED this 12th day of June, 2012. 
I hereby certify that two copies of this brief were served on the plaintiff's attorney, Brad 
Andrews, POBox 895, Boise, ID 83701, on this date, by mailing them to him by U Sail, 
postage prepaid. 
DATED this 12th day of June, 2012. 
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